

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA**

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|-----------------------|---|-------------------------|
| JERED DAVIS, |) | |
| |) | |
| Petitioner, |) | |
| v. |) | No. 2:11-cv-169-JMS-WGH |
| |) | |
| SUPERINTENDENT BROWN, |) | |
| |) | |
| Respondent. |) | |

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(a) only if it finds the applicant is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.@ *Id.* Because habeas petitioner Jered Davis has failed to show that this is the case with respect to the disciplinary proceeding challenged in this case, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be **denied** and this action dismissed.

Discussion

In a disciplinary proceeding identified as No. WVE 11-03-0062, Davis was found guilty of violating prison rules at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility by engaging in sexual misconduct. The evidence favorable to the decision of the hearing officer is that during the afternoon of March 21, 2011, Davis addressed Correctional Officer Yarber by making references to homoerotic sexual activities.

Contending that the proceeding was constitutionally infirm, Davis seeks a writ of habeas corpus.

Indiana state prisoners have a liberty interest in their good-time credits and therefore are entitled to due process before the state may revoke them. *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974); *Cochran v. Buss*, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004). The right to due process in this setting is important and is well-defined. Due process requires the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited opportunity to present evidence to an impartial decision-maker, a written statement articulating the reasons for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and A some evidence in the record@ to support the finding of guilt. See *Superintend., Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill*, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 566,

570-71 (1974); *Piggie v. Cotton*, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003); *Webb v. Anderson*, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).


AThe best way to conduct analysis under ' 2254 is to assume that the state wants to act exactly as its officers . . . have done, and then ask whether the federal Constitution countermands that decision.@ *Hill v. Wilson*, 519 F.3d 366, 370 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing cases). Under *Wolff* and *Hill*, Davis received all the process to which he was entitled. That is, the charge was clear, adequate notice was given, and the evidence was sufficient. In addition, (1) Davis was given the opportunity to appear before the hearing officer and make a statement concerning the charge, (2) the hearing officer issued a sufficient statement of its findings, and (3) the hearing officer issued a written reason for the decision and for the sanctions which were imposed. That same record shows, moreover, that the hearing officer considered each of the three witness statements Davis presented at the hearing.

Davis' claims that he was denied the protections afforded by *Wolff* are either refuted by the expanded record and based on an assertions which do not entitle him to relief. "The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government." *Wolff*, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceeding, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Davis to the relief he seeks. Accordingly, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be **denied** and the action dismissed.

Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 10/06/2011

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Jane Magnus-Stinson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana